I build a model of neoclassical production to examine the capital market and welfare effects of a uniform accounting standard (like IFRS). Firms vary in their cost of compliance to the standard, and investors vary in their cost of learning diverse standards for capital allocation. I show that a uniform accounting standard increases the quantity of capital in the economy and lowers the cost of capital.
Introduction
Over the last decade, the world has witnessed a slow, but steady march toward convergence of international accounting standards. Dozens of countries around the globe have already shifted to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and the Securities and Exchange Commission has pledged to harmonize United States Generally Accepting Accounting Principles (US GAAP) with IFRS. But are uniform accounting standards even desirable? While the academic community has long articulated some skepticism of a single, uniform accounting standard (Ball (2006) , Dye and Sunder (2001), Sunder (2002) ), only recently has this skepticism turned into concrete hesitation by accounting regulators.
1 I advance a simple theoretical framework for thinking about the costs and benefits of uniform accounting standards. I show exactly how uniform accounting standards lower the cost of capital, and under what conditions society is better off under a single uniform accounting standard than under multiple diverse accounting standards. I show that uniform accounting standards are better when firm productivity and variation between investors is large, but diverse accounting standards are better when the cost of investment and variation between firms is large.
The measure of a "good" accounting standard stems from welfare economics, and the objective of the paper is to aim for economic efficiency. In particular, a government regulator selects accounting standards to maximize social welfare. Throughout, I consider total surplus as the measure of social welfare, namely, that I assign equal Pareto weights to firms and investors in the social welfare function. 2 The regulator acts as a single entity, and as such, the model abstracts away from strategic games and rent-seeking between different accounting standard setting bodies. This is not to insinuate that different bodies, like FASB and IASB, agree completely on accounting standards. But the current movement to harmonize international accounting standards suggests that there is substantial coordination between international accounting standard setters.
The model combines neoclassical production with Hotelling product choice. A continuum of investors supplies capital in a competitive marketplace to a continuum of firms, and supply and demand dictates the market-clearing price and quantity of capital. A government regulator selects an accounting standard that firms must adhere to in order This neoclassical approach focusing on supply and demand does not deny the existence of information problems in financial reporting, but does deliver novel results in a simple and tractable framework. To arrive at implications for the cost of capital, I
build on the literature that connects stock returns to firm production functions. bate on convergence of the two major accounting standards, IFRS and US GAAP, the theory applies more broadly. This can also apply to variation in accounting standards within a country, as well as between countries. On top of this, the theory gives guidance on whether a single accounting standard should have multiple dimensions within a single overarching standard, like the separate rules for financial and nonfinancial firms within US GAAP. Nonetheless, I now review the debate over international accounting standards, the primary application of the theory.
Policy and Academic Debate on International Accounting Standards
The various policy bodies involved in international accounting standards have slowly shifted toward a single standard over several years. The former chair of the US Securities and Exchange Commission, Christopher Cox, in particular, spoke primarily of the comparability benefit of a single standard, which would ultimately improve transparency of financial reporting and investor confidence. 4 The current SEC chair Mary Schapiro has broadly supported convergence, though is more skeptical, claiming that IFRS standards lack the detail of US standards, leave much to interpretation, impose high transition costs, and rob the SEC of its oversight of accounting standards. that when this cost is small, a uniform standard is better than diverse standards. In this sense, a uniform standard and the institutional environment (captured by a low cost of investment) are complements and reinforce one another. This follows from the theory and is consistent with the literature on reporting incentives in international accounting.
The existing theoretical literature on international accounting standards is thin and does not directly address whether a single standard is socially optimal. The closest is Barth, Clinch, and Shibano (1999) , who examine the effects of harmonizing domestic with foreign accounting standards. Like my model, they assume investors must bear a cost to learning a new (domestic) accounting standard, and they make predictions on trading volume and the cost of capital. Unlike my paper, they consider the precision of GAAP as a key component to determining when harmonization leads to lower cost of capital. Though their model differs in many of the details, they do arrive at a similar conclusion that harmonization is not necessarily the best option.
6
Other work examines the issue of uniformity versus flexibility within a single accounting standard (e.g., Dye and Verrecchia 1995; Dye and Sridharan 2008) , addressing the wide claim that IFRS allows more discretion and flexibility than US GAAP. While this is an important issue, I focus on whether a uniform standard is socially optimal, rather than the optimal structure of a single accounting standard. Finally, Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007) model the effects of accounting information on the cost of capital, finding that an increase in the quality of a firm's disclosure about its own future cash flows has a direct effect on the assessed covariance with other firm's cash flows, thereby establishing that accounting disclosure can reduce the cost of capital. While their paper certainly differs from mine in both setup and focus, it shares the goal of mapping between the accounting system and the measure of cost of capital. They argue accounting disclosure reduces information asymmetry between firms and investors, lowering the cost of capital. I take a neoclassical approach, arguing that accounting standards shift the market supply of capital, which lowers the cost of capital.
While the theoretical models on international accounting are scarce, there is a small collection of policy pieces written by leading academics on the question of regulatory competition in accounting standards. Dye and Sunder (2001) run through many of the 6 I find that there is an unambiguous benefit from a uniform standard, namely that it lowers cost of capital and increases liquidity. The question then remains on whether the costs of a uniform standard outweigh this unambiguous benefit. Barth et al (1999) do not find that harmonization necessarily produces the benefit of lower cost of capital and higher liquidity. In that sense, their paper takes more of a skeptical view on uniform standards that does this one.
arguments for and against regulatory competition, especially the concern for a "race to the bottom" that plagues the economics of consumer product liability. Sunder (2002) extends this discussion and argues that competition would improve the efficiency of accounting standards because regulators would be forced to cater their standards to both firms and investors. Kothari, Ramanna, and Skinner (2009) also defend competition among accounting regulators, using the arguments of better economic innovation and diversity in a world of regulatory competition. While monopolies may innovate less than competitive firms, my focus here is on optimal diversity rather than optimal level of innovation.
